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A B S T R A C T
Evidence shows that there are individual diﬀerences in the extent to which people attend to and integrate
information into their decisions about the predictive contingencies between events and outcomes. In particular,
information about the absence of events or outcomes, presented outside the current task frame, is often
neglected. This trend is particularly evident in depression, as well as other psychopathologies, though reasons for
information neglect remain unclear. We investigated this phenomenon across two experiments (Experiment 1:
N= 157; Experiment 2: N= 150) in which participants, scoring low and high in the Beck Depression Inventory,
were asked to learn a simple predictive relationship between a visual cue and an auditory outcome. We
manipulated whether or not participants had prior experience of the visual cue outside of the task frame,
whether such experience took place in the same or diﬀerent context to the learning task, and the nature of the
action required to signal occurrence of the auditory outcome. We found that all participants were capable of
including extra-task experience into their assessment of the predictive cue-outcome relationship in whatever
context it occurred. However, for mildly depressed participants, adjacent behaviours and similarity between the
extra-task experience and the main task, inﬂuenced information integration, with patterns of ‘over-integration’
evident, rather than neglect as we had expected. Findings are suggestive of over-generalised experience on the
part of mildly depressed participants.
Learning about the relationships between stimuli or behaviour and
subsequent outcomes is fundamental to human ability to function
adaptively within an environment. Given our evolutionary success, it
might make sense to assume that human learning follows normative
rules (e.g., Crocker, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1989) that would
facilitate appropriate future behaviour. However, such rules often
include the assumption that all information relevant to a given
relationship is equally weighted. Evidence actually shows that most
people weight some information types more highly than others
(Kao &Wasserman, 1993; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Wasserman, Elek,
Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993) and almost neglect other equally relevant
information (Mata, Garcia-Marques, Ferreira, &Mendonça, 2015;
White, 2002). As we will explain below, the neglect of speciﬁc types
of information is subject to individual diﬀerences and is much more
apparent in depressed than non-depressed people (Msetﬁ, Murphy,
Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005) although the reasons for this neglect
remain unclear. The current research examines this diﬀerence.
The matrix shown in Fig. 1 (below) provides a simple framework for
studying the information that is thought to contribute to learning about
the co-occurrence of two stimuli. Here, we refer to the stimuli as the
event and the outcome in order to distinguish between them and to
emphasise the temporal order of causal relationships. The letters in the
cells of the matrix denote the frequency of each information type or
event-outcome conjunction. ΔP is the normative measure of the
strength and direction of the relationship and is based on the assump-
tion that each event-outcome conjunction is equally relevant and
important to the contingency between event and outcome (Allan,
1980). People's actions in anticipating, predicting or generating out-
comes, and their judgements about the strength of the relation can be
mapped onto ΔP and this assumption tested.
In the laboratory, researchers have exposed participants to event-
outcome information over a number of experimental trials, usually
separated by inter-trial intervals (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984), though some have used tabular
presentation (e.g., Greville & Buehner, 2007; Vallée-Tourangeau,
Payton, &Murphy, 2008; White, 2002). Events and outcomes used in
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previous research include, for example, the brief presentation of an
auditory or visual stimulus (e.g., geometric shape), ﬁctional real world
events (e.g., fertiliser given, ﬂower blooms) or an action made by the
participant (e.g., button press), with predictive behaviours (e.g.,
Kattner & Green, 2016), operant behaviours (e.g., Msetﬁ,
Murphy, & Kornbrot, 2012) and contingency judgements (e.g.,
Allan & Jenkins, 1983) used as dependent measures. Findings show
that such measures are sensitive to diﬀerent levels of contingency, and
that correlations with the normative ΔP model are high (r= 0.8,
Allan & Jenkins, 1980; r= 0.98, Wasserman et al., 1993) with varia-
bility which depends on the precise procedure used.
In spite of such high correlations between dependent measures and
the normative model, evidence also suggests that the information in the
cells of the contingency matrix is weighted unequally. One example is
Kao and Wasserman's (1993) study, which involved comparisons
between pairs of contingency conditions that were constructed speci-
ﬁcally to identify the weight that participants gave to each cell or
conjunction. Over a series of experiments, with both tabular and trial-
by-trial presentation, data suggested that participants weighted the
information unequally, such that cell ‘a’ > cell ‘b’ > cell ‘c’ >
cell ‘d’, in terms of contribution to the contingency. Numerous other
studies have reported evidence consistent with this ﬁnding (e.g.,
Crocker, 1981; Shaklee &Wasserman, 1986; Wasserman,
Dorner, & Kao, 1990). Thus, overall, it seems that occasions when
events and outcomes are present are more salient and perhaps are
considered to be more important than their absence, even though their
absence is equally relevant to the problem at hand according to a
normative analysis. Furthermore event and outcome absence informa-
tion is considered of least importance and is often neglected or
discounted in learning (Mata et al., 2015).
Thus data from contingency learning studies evidences high corre-
lations with the normative model along with unequal weighting and
sometimes neglect of ‘absence’ information. In spite of this, evidence
also shows that people can and will integrate ‘absence’ information,
with a strong eﬀect on learning. This type of integration is particularly
clear when the information is presented outside of the current task
frame. One example of this was provided by Msetﬁ et al. (2005) who
exposed participants to zero contingency conditions in which the event
was an action and the outcome was a light ﬂash. The key ﬁnding was
that healthy participants judged the action-outcome relation to be
stronger when inter-trial intervals (ITI) were long than when they were
short. It was argued that the ITI, although taking place outside of the
task frame itself (the trial), contained no actions and no outcomes and
as such was conceptually the same as the absence information
contained in cell ‘d’ of the contingency matrix. Thus, results suggested
that participants integrated this information into their contingency
judgements and that the true contingency was inﬂated as a conse-
quence. Therefore, in spite of evidence for the neglect of cell ‘d’ absence
information, this data shows that people can and will use it (see also for
goal directed behaviour, Mata et al., 2015).
Another classic example of the integration of absence information
from outside the task frame involves cell ‘b’ of the contingency table. In
latent inhibition procedures (Lubow&Moore, 1959), participants are
pre-exposed to an event in the absence of an outcome before the main
task itself commences. They are subsequently required to learn that the
same event is predictive of an outcome. Typically, results show that the
absence information, which is presented initially (event-no outcome), is
integrated into subsequent learning because such learning is slower in
pre-exposed participants in comparison to those who did not experience
pre-exposure (Escobar, Arcediano, &Miller, 2003; Gray et al., 2001).
Therefore, people can and will use absence information and it has a
powerful eﬀect on learning.
So far, we have described evidence that, in some procedures,
absence information is considered relevant and is integrated (e.g.,
Escobar, Arcediano, &Miller, 2002; Msetﬁ et al., 2005), yet in other
procedures, absence information is neglected or simply plays a less
salient role in human learning and behaviour. Whilst that topic is of
interest in its own right, in the current study we are particularly
interested in understanding how depression inﬂuences information
neglect and integration.
One example of this is that people with mild depression are less
likely to integrate absence information from outside the task frame into
their contingency learning as non-depressed people do. Evidence comes
from studies showing that extending the duration of the inter-trial
interval had no eﬀect on contingency learning for participants with
mild levels of depression (Msetﬁ, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007; Msetﬁ
et al., 2005). Although other disorders are not the focus of this paper,
we note that there are instances of information neglect related to other
individual diﬀerences. Speciﬁcally, people with schizophrenia (e.g.,
Baruch, Hemsley, & Gray, 1988; Gray, Hemsley, & Gray, 1992;
Guterman, Josiassen, Bashore, Johnson, & Lubow, 1996), and healthy
people with high levels of schizotypy (Braunstein-Bercovitz & Lubow,
1998; Gray, Fernandez, Williams, Ruddle, & Snowden, 2002; Lubow,
Ingberg-Sachs, Zalstein-Orda, & Gewirtz, 1992) also neglect absence
information under pre-exposure conditions in latent inhibition proce-
dures. Counter intuitively, because the individual diﬀerence relates to
psychopathology, this neglect leaves their learning intact. Depending
on the particular situation, information integration could be helpful or
unhelpful to people's ability to behave adaptively in a given situation
and it is important that we understand the conditions and individual
diﬀerences that aﬀect integration.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the eﬀects of
depression on information neglect and integration. Brieﬂy, theoretical
explanations for other individual diﬀerence eﬀects have involved
associative learning processes, invoking impaired attention and an
inability to ﬁlter irrelevant information or to learn about context
(e.g., Hall & Rodriguez, 2010; Lubow, Feldon, &Weiner, 1988; Msetﬁ,
Wade, &Murphy, 2013) amongst others. However, it has also been
argued that what is being measured in many such studies is not learning
per se but rather (and related to methodological issues) a decision
mechanism based on computation of conditional probabilities (for a
discussion see: Le Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010) as in the contingency
matrix given in Fig. 1.
The contingency framework is useful for our purposes here and may
provide some much needed clarity. Rather than focusing on the
underlying learning processes and the purpose of each component of
the task (although we plan to return to these later), the contingency
framework merely identiﬁes the type of information, which is present
in a given task, and has or has not been integrated into learning. This
also allows us to compute a normative metric that simply describes the
strength of the relationship in either case. This framework avoids some
of the theoretical and interpretational confusion that is less than helpful
when trying to understand individual diﬀerences. Moreover, it should
Fig. 1. Generic contingency matrix showing the relationship between the occurrence of
an event (e.g., action or event) and the occurrence of an outcome. The notations a, b, c,
and d refer to the frequencies of each event-outcome conjunction. The normative model
for the one-way relation between them is ΔP. ΔP= a / (a + b) – c / (c + d) and
generates a number between −1 and +1 denoting the strength and direction of the
relationship. This is based on the assumption that the weighting of each conjunction is
equal a = b = c = d.
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allow us to identify the speciﬁc subtypes of absence information to
which individual diﬀerences are sensitive.
Returning to information neglect in depression, there are a number
of dissociable components to the extra-trial (inter-trial interval) in-
formation that people with depression do not integrate into their
learning. Thus, it is not clear whether depression compromises sensi-
tivity to one or a number of these aspects (see Table 1).
In the experiments reported in this paper, we planned to examine
the diﬀerent types of information shown in Table 1, to elucidate reasons
for increased informational neglect in depression speciﬁcally and
depression eﬀects on learning more generally. As in many previous
studies, participants were categorised (Msetﬁ, Cavus, & Brosnan, 2016;
Msetﬁ et al., 2013) by their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) as mildly
depressed or not depressed. These criteria are well validated for
categorising student participants into these groups and have yielded
depression diﬀerences on similar learning tasks (Chase et al., 2011).
We chose to use a simple behavioural task in which participants had
to learn about the relationship between the occurrence of a visual
stimulus and the subsequent occurrence of a brief auditory stimulus.
Absence information presented outside the current task frame was
manipulated and subsequent learning was then measured via the
recording of predictions made on each trial. These predictions were
made by participants through their behaviour, such that both instances
of actions and no actions were predictions of the occurrence and non-
occurrence of the auditory stimulus.
This procedure deviates in important ways from the no/action and
no/outcome contingency procedures used to detect depression eﬀects
in previous research (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Msetﬁ et al., 2005). In
previous studies, a trial marker stimulus would indicate the partici-
pants' opportunity to act, which might generate the occurrence of an
outcome. In the present study, an analogous set of stimuli was
experienced but for somewhat diﬀerent reasons. First, the predictive
stimulus occurred, then the participants made their predictive response
(action, or no action) and then the outcome stimulus occurred or not.
So, the stimulus sequence (event, action, outcome) is almost identical
between this and previous studies. This description simpliﬁes the
diﬀerence between this and previous research with the aim of allowing
us to study, systematically, the eﬀects of the various aspects of
information neglect and integration, speciﬁcally ‘absence’ information
on learning.
1. Experiment 1
In this ﬁrst experiment, we tested whether depressed and non-
depressed people's learning about the relationship between a predictive
stimulus and an outcome is aﬀected by exposure to contextual
information and the absence of outcomes which occur outside the
current task frame (see Table 1). In this study, in order to make the
‘additional information’ explicit, the contingency learning task was
divided into two phases, as in a latent inhibition task (e.g.,
Lubow&Moore, 1959), with the additional information presented in
the ﬁrst phase.
In Phase 1, 80 trials exposed participants to the stimuli of critical
interest in this study. Half of the participants experienced the predictive
stimulus (pre-exposure group) in the absence of reinforcement, whilst
the other half (no pre-exposure group) experienced context alone in the
absence of reinforcement. In addition, the experimental task context
was either the same or diﬀerent to the subsequent second phase. In all
cases, there was no exposure to the outcome stimulus in Phase 1.
Then, in the second phase, all participants were asked to predict the
occurrence of a brief auditory stimulus (explosion) by performing an
action (button press). Over 160 trials, the predictive stimulus was either
present (stimulus = , k = 20) or it was absent (stimulus = ,
k = 140). A summary of the procedure used in Phase 2 is given in
Fig. 2 below, and summarises the stimuli, actions and outcomes present
or absent on each trial. In no pre-exposure conditions (Fig. 2, left), there
is a perfect contingency, ΔP= 1, between the predictive stimulus and
the occurrence of the outcome. However, in pre-exposure conditions
the perfect ΔP value is degraded by numerous presentations of the
predictive stimulus outside of the task frame in Phase 1 (see +80 added
Table 1
Dissociable informational components of inter-trial interval information.
Inter-trial intervals Type of information
(i) No outcomes occur Absence of reinforcement
(ii) No events occur Absence of stimulus
(iii) No actions occur Absence of behaviour
(iv) Inter-trial intervals take place in a
context
Contextual information is present
(v) Inter-trial intervals take place outside
of the experimental trial
Additional information outside
the task frame
Fig. 2. Overall summary of procedure used in Experiment 1 with ΔP calculations given for each pre-exposure group. The values in the contingency matrices relate to the frequencies of
each event-outcome conjunction. The triangle is the predictive stimulus (event) and the square represents the absence of the predictive stimulus. NB. ‘+80’ refers to the additional no
outcome trials presented in Phase 1 to the pre-exposure group. *refers to the predictive response participants must make in each trial in Phase 2.
R.M. Msetﬁ et al. Acta Psychologica 178 (2017) 1–11
3
to the cell frequency), and the ΔP value computes to a weak 0.2
contingency.
The manipulation of context and outcome absence was extra-task
frame variables designed to inﬂuence learning in Phase 2. This allowed
us to test sensitivity to two of the ﬁve information types in Table 1,
whilst controlling for the others. If participants are sensitive to the
absence of reinforcement information presented in Phase 1, then Fig. 2
shows that there should be weaker learning in the pre-exposure group
in Phase 2. In addition, if participants are sensitive to the contextual
aspect of this learning task, this pattern should only be evident in
participants for whom Phase 1 context is the same as Phase 2 context.
Moreover, depressive diﬀerences in sensitivity to the context, either
increased or decreased sensitivity, should be evident in the size of pre-
exposure eﬀects in the diﬀerent contexts.
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants
Participants completed the BDI online to measure their mood state
before being invited to participate and then, again, on arrival to take
part in the experiment. These participants were recruited from two
university populations (n1 = 117, 75%; n2 = 40, 25%). The resulting
sample of 157 participants were assigned to the high BDI (n= 60,
female: n= 39, male: n= 13) or low BDI (n= 97, female: n= 58,
male: n= 24) groups, based on a median cut oﬀ of 5 on the BDI
(BDI > 5 = high, BDI≤ 5 = low), as we have previously observed
BDI eﬀects with a cut-oﬀ point of 5 (see Chase et al., 2011). Overall and
as expected, the BDI groups diﬀered on BDI scores, t (155) = 14.92,
p < 0.001, as well as DASS anxiety, depression and stress scores, all
ts > 5.05, all ps < 0.001.
Participants in each mood group were then randomly assigned to
one of four experimental groups, pre-exposure/same context, no pre-
exposure/same context, pre-exposure/diﬀerent context, no pre-expo-
sure/diﬀerent context. The four experimental groups were successfully
matched on digit span and estimated IQ, a univariate ANOVA gave F(3,
153) < 1, p= 0.977, and F(3, 153) < 1, p= 0.497, respectively for
these measures. The groups did not diﬀer on BDI or DASS anxiety,
depression and stress scales scores, all Fs < 1, all ps > 0.43.
Participants from each data collection site were equally distributed
across experimental groups (Table 2).
1.1.2. Design
A fully factorial 2 × 2 × 2 design was employed with BDI group
(low BDI, high BDI), exposure group (pre-exposure, no pre-exposure)
and context group (same context, diﬀerent context) as between-subjects
factors. Two dependent variables were analysed in this study. The ﬁrst
dependent variable was the number of trials taken to reach the success
criterion (see Gray et al., 1992), and was recorded as the number of
trials taken in Phase 2 to reach ﬁve consecutive correct responses with
no false alarms. The second dependent variable used here was D-prime
(D′), which compares the target ‘hit’ rate to the false alarm rate (i.e. Z[p
(hit)]− Z[p(false alarm)]). This psychophysical measure provides an
index of participants' sensitivity to the target, but normalises this for
number of target versus non-target presentations, and response tenden-
cies. The latter might be argued to inﬂate traditional trials to criterion
measures. In addition D′ can be calculated over trial blocks and it is
therefore possible to examine speed of learning in each condition. Here
we report both measures in order to ensure comparability with previous
work.
1.1.3. Materials
1.1.3.1. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck et al., 1961). The BDI is a
self-report inventory of depression symptoms and has been used in
research with clinical and student populations for many years.
Participants were asked to choose from 21 statements that best
describe them. These ranged from neutral statements (e.g., I do not
feel like a failure) scored as 0, to more extreme mood related statements
(e.g., I feel I am a complete failure as a person) scored as up to a value
of 3. Total scores could range from 0 to 63 where higher scores indicate
higher levels of depression. The BDI has been validated in student
samples, with correlations of 0.77 being reported between BDI scores
and a psychiatric rating of severity of depression (Bumberry,
Oliver, &McClure, 1978).
1.1.3.2. Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS: Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995). The DASS is a 42-item self-report questionnaire that yields
three subscales, measuring the severity of depression, anxiety and stress
symptoms. Participants rate each item (e.g., I found myself getting
upset by quite trivial things) on a scale of 0 to 3, indicating the extent to
which this had applied to them in the past week. A score of 3 would
indicate that the statement had applied to the participant most of the
time. There are 14 items for each of the emotional states and each
subscale can yield a maximum possible score of 42.
1.1.3.3. Learning task. All experimental stimuli were programmed and
presented using computer (REALbasic, 2009, Release 2.1). Realistic
graphics of rooms containing a TV cabinet and a TV were used to
represent distinct contexts (see Appendix 1). For the same context
condition, the room in Phase 1 and Phase 2 was always a blue bedroom.
The diﬀerent context condition exposed participants to the same blue
bedroom in Phase 1, and a green bedroom in Phase 2.
For all participants, Phase 1 involved the presentation of three-letter
codes constructed using three sets of 40 randomly selected letters
presented over 80 trials. The letters were shown on the screen in a
sequence, like ‘H Q J’, and written in white bold Helvetica size 36 font
with 25 pixels in between each letter. The top of each letter was
positioned to be 25 pixels below the top of the shape on which it was
superimposed. For participants in the pre-exposure group, the predic-
tive stimulus appeared behind the letter codes. Participants in the no-
pre exposure group simply saw the letter codes.
Table 2
Participant characteristics for Experiment 1.
Pre-exposure No pre-exposure
Same context Diﬀerent context Same context Diﬀerent context
Low BDI High BDI Low BDI High BDI Low BDI High BDI Low BDI High BDI
n= 27 n= 18 n= 23 n= 13 n= 23 n= 15 n= 24 n= 14
BDI 2.33 (0.30) 11.22 (1.63) 1.74 (0.35) 12.31 (1.55) 2.65 (0.35) 13.60 (1.52) 2.13 (0.37) 9.21 (0.96)
DASS-D 1.85 (0.41) 8.67 (1.61) 1.65 (0.50) 8.00 (1.73) 2.48 (0.52) 8.40 (1.84) 2.83 (0.68) 7.00 (0.96)
DASS-S 4.67 (0.78) 9.78 (1.14) 3.70 (0.98) 9.62 (1.13) 4.91 (0.81) 10.47 (1.82) 3.92 (0.77) 10.50 (1.71)
DASS-A 1.81 (0.36) 7.00 (1.51) 3.22 (1.07) 6.46 (1.35) 2.17 (0.44) 8.20 (1.97) 2.63 (0.91) 8.86 (4.02)
Estimated IQ 110.36 (1.29) 110.65 (1.41) 111.17 (1.18) 112.05 (1.12) 110.37 (1.58) 110.78 (1.13) 109.99 (1.21) 108.13 (1.90)
Digit 7.44 (0.40) 7.83 (0.28) 7.52 (0.29) 7.77 (0.47) 7.70 (0.29) 7.47 (0.22) 7.17 (0.38) 8.00 (0.30)
NB. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DASS = Depression (D), Anxiety (A), Stress (S) Scales. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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In the Phase 2, a 500 ms auditory stimulus occurred on 20 of the
160 experimental trials following presentation of the predictive stimu-
lus. The predictive stimulus was a blue triangle shape and was
150 pixels wide and 100 pixels in height. On the other 140 trials, the
predictive stimulus was absent and a blue square shape, 100 pixels wide
and 100 pixels in height, was shown. During presentation, both stimuli
were positioned centrally on the TV screen and the TV itself was
positioned centrally in terms of screen width and 75% of screen height
from the top of the screen (see Appendix 1).
1.1.4. Procedure
After reading an information sheet and having the opportunity to
ask questions, participants gave informed consent to their participation.
They then completed a range of demographic questions, the digit span
task, the BDI and DASS. Demographic data were used to estimate pre-
morbid IQ (for method and equations see Barona, Reynolds, & Chastain,
1984).
Following this, participants were asked to read the instructions for
Phase 1 of the learning task (see Appendix 2). Participants would play a
game during which they would be taken to a virtual room, containing a
TV and games console, visualised by a realistic picture displayed on the
computer screen. A series of three-letter codes would appear on the TV
screen and participants were asked to note the fourth code and count
how many times it reoccurred. There were 40 codes and each one was
displayed twice over 80 trials in a random order. Each trial and
stimulus exposure lasted for 1500 ms and was separated from the next
trial by a 500 ms inter-trial interval. For the pre-exposure condition, the
three-letter code was superimposed over a blue triangle on the
television screen. In the no pre-exposure condition, the three-letter
code simply appeared on the TV screen. In all cases, the three-letter
code was centred on the TV screen. At the end of the 80 trials,
participants were required to enter the number of times they had seen
the fourth code using the computer keyboard.
Phase 2 instructions stated that participants would be taken to a
room with a TV and games console and that a series of three-letter
codes would appear on the TV screen (see Appendix 2). As in Phase 1,
the room was a virtual room represented by pictures on the computer
screen, and was the same for the context same group, and diﬀerent to
Phase 1 for the context diﬀerent group. Participants were told that,
during this second game, they might notice the occurrence of some
small explosions. Their task was to work out the rule that guided the
occurrence of the explosions. Participants were asked to press the space
bar every time they thought the explosion was about to occur. The same
40 three-letter codes used in Phase 1 were also used in Phase 2, with
each block of 40 codes presented in a random order during four blocks
of 40 experimental trials, resulting in a total of 160 experimental trials.
The timing of each trial was the same as Phase 1.
For each block, 5 of the 40 trials included presentation of the
predictive stimulus for 1500 ms, followed by the sound stimulus, which
had a duration of 500 ms. On the other 35 trials, the predictive stimulus
was absent for 1500 ms after which the sound stimulus was not played
and there was silence for 500 ms. Trial timing was therefore exactly the
same as for Phase 1. Responses were only possible during the 1500 ms
display of the predictive stimulus. At the end of the 1500 ms interval,
the trial was coded as a response or non-response trial. Order of trials
was randomised across blocks. After 160 trials, the game ended and
participants were debriefed, thanked and received a nominal payment
in return for their participation.
1.2. Results and discussion
Response data was collected on every trial in Phase 2 and a score
based on trials taken to reach criterion and a value for D′ for each trial
block were calculated for each participant. These data are displayed
separately below and our observations were tested using a between
subjects and mixed factorial ANOVAs where appropriate, with alpha
held constant at 0.05 throughout unless stated otherwise.
1.2.1. Trials to criterion
Fig. 3 suggests that for all participants, irrespective of their mood
state, pre-exposure to the non-reinforced predictive stimulus in any
context in Phase 1 resulted in the perception of a weak relationship
between stimulus and outcome in Phase 2.
The results of the ANOVA showed that there was a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of pre-exposure condition, F(1, 149) = 39.37, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.209, with participants in the pre-exposure group taking on
average 7 more trials to reach criterion than the no pre-exposure group.
There were no other signiﬁcant main eﬀects or signiﬁcant interactions,
all Fs < 2.09, all ps > 0.14.
1.2.2. D-prime
As there was no evidence of a context eﬀect, for clarity, we have
collapsed D′ data over context conditions in Fig. 4. Increasing values for
D′ indicate that target sensitivity increased rapidly over trial blocks,
with the pre-exposure eﬀect evident from block 1 to block 4.
The results of the mixed factorial ANOVA supported these observa-
tions, with a large signiﬁcant eﬀect of pre-exposure group, F(1, 149)
= 34.88, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.19. The main eﬀect of trial block was
signiﬁcant, F(3, 447) = 139.01, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.483, as was the
block by pre-exposure interaction, F(3, 447) = 6.10, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.039. Follow-up simple eﬀects analyses showed that whilst the
pre-exposure eﬀect was signiﬁcant across trial blocks, it reduced in size
Fig. 3. Mean number of trials to reach the success criterion of ﬁve consecutive correct
trials without false alarms as a function of pre-exposure, context change, and mood state.
Note. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. Pre = pre-exposure; N-Pre = no
pre-exposure; Same = same context; Dif = diﬀerent context; Low = low BDI; High = high
BDI.
Fig. 4. Mean value for D′ for each trial block as a function of pre-exposure and mood
state. Note. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Pre = pre-exposure; No-
Pre = no pre-exposure; Low = low BDI; High = high BDI.
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signiﬁcantly by block 4 (block 1 ηp2 = 0.312, block 2 ηp2 = 0.153,
block ηp2 = 0.091, block 4 ηp2 = 0.086). There were no other eﬀects or
interactions that were reliable or approached the signiﬁcance criterion.
Overall, the results of this experiment showed that exposure to a
stimulus in the absence of outcomes, outside of the frame of the current
task, weakens learning as predicted in Fig. 2. However, the context
manipulation had no eﬀect. This was the case for both depressed and
non-depressed participants. Therefore, Experiment 1 indicated no
diﬀerences in learning between depressed and non-depressed people
and showed that subsequent learning is sensitive to the presentation of
non-reinforced stimuli presented outside the frame of the current task.
These data suggest that neither sensitivity to no outcome and
context are compromised in mild depression, and perhaps that previous
reports of learning impairments in people with depression reﬂect
processing other aspects of absence information. For example, the
experimental manipulations in Experiment 1 were situated in the top
row of the contingency matrix, shown in Fig. 1. As we described in the
introduction, the top row of the contingency relates to the frequencies
of outcomes and no outcomes in the presence of the predictive stimulus.
This experimental manipulation of pre-exposing participants to in-
stances of the predictive stimulus in the absence of the outcome might
be thought of as ‘cell b’ type experience. This manipulation failed to
evidence eﬀects of depression on learning and shows that depressed
people can and will integrate information from outside the task frame
into subsequent performance.
However, as we noted in the introduction, previous studies have
speciﬁcally suggested that depression eﬀects are focussed on informa-
tion contained in the least weighted cell of the contingency matrix, ‘cell
d’. Not only does cell d include no outcomes and context, it also
involves the absence of behaviour or actions. Therefore, in order to test
sensitivity to absence of actions and outcomes, Experiment 2 reversed
participants' predictive response requirement in Phase 2. This meant
that the behaviour required to predict the outcome was ‘no action’,
whereas an ‘action’ was required to predict a ‘no outcome’ trial. A
secondary eﬀect of this manipulation is to equate the informational
content of Phase 1 pre-exposure with Phase 2.
2. Experiment 2
In order to test participants' sensitivity to the absence of actions and
outcomes, rather than the absence of outcome only, we adjusted the
experimental procedure and reversed the response requirements. In all
other aspects, the procedure was identical. Thus, in Experiment 2, the
absence of the predictive stimulus (rather than its presence, in Fig. 5
labelled occurrence of event) required an action; this might be thought
of as an ‘all clear’ action. The predictive stimulus itself did not require
an action because participants were required to take ‘no action’ if they
thought the outcome was about to occur (in Fig. 5, labelled absence of
event). Conceptually, this pre-exposure manipulation now involves the
bottom row of the contingency table (cell d) rather than the top row
(cell b). So, in other words, actions were to predict the ‘all clear’ (no
outcome) and no action would predict outcome occurrence. The aim of
this manipulation was to test participants' sensitivity to pre-exposed
information when marked by the absence of actions thus equating the
informational content of Phases 1 and 2. In summary, all aspects of
Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1, with the exception of the
action required on each trial.
2.1. Method
Only details that are diﬀerent to Experiment 1 are given here.
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from two university populations
(n1 = 115, 77%; n2 = 34, 23%). The sample of 150 participants were
either categorised as members of the high BDI (n= 77, female: n= 51,
male: n= 26) or low BDI (n= 73, female: n= 47, male: n= 26)
groups, see Table 3. Overall, the low and high BDI groups diﬀered on
BDI scores, t(148) = 15.40, p < 0.001, 95% CI[8.87, 11.48], as well as
DASS anxiety, depression and stress scores, all ts > 7.50, all ps <
0.001. Experimental conditions were successfully matched on digit
span and estimated IQ; a multivariate ANOVA gave F(3, 146) = 1.61,
p= 0.189, and F(3, 146) < 1, p= 0.492, respectively for these
measures. The four conditions did not diﬀer on BDI, DASS anxiety,
depression and stress scales scores, all F < 1.97, all ps > 0.12.
Participants from the two recruitment sites were equally distributed
across experimental groups.
2.1.2. Procedure
Participants were requested to press the spacebar on the computer
keyboard, when they thought the sound stimulus was not likely to
occur, and to do nothing when the sound stimulus was likely to occur.
Fig. 5. Overall summary of procedure used in Experiment 2 with ΔP calculations given for each pre-exposure group. NB. ‘+80’ refers to the additional non-reinforced trials presented in Phase
1 to the pre-exposure group. * refers to the predictive response participants must make in each trial in Phase 2.
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2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Trials to criterion
Trials to criterion scores are shown in Fig. 6. For low BDI groups, the
data are similar to the previous experiment. Low BDI participants in the
pre-exposure group took 8 trials longer to reach criterion than low BDI
participants in the no pre-exposure group, who reached criterion at the
ﬁrst opportunity. However, high BDI participants appeared to take
equally as many trials to reach criterion irrespective of pre-exposure
(Fig. 6).
Consistent with these observations, the ANOVA showed signiﬁcant
main eﬀects of pre-exposure group, F(1, 142) = 25.27, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.151, and BDI group, F(1, 142) = 5.18, p= 0.024, ηp2 = 0.035,
as well as a signiﬁcant interaction between them, F(1, 142) = 7.93,
p= 0.006, ηp2 = 0.053. There were no other reliable main eﬀects or
interactions. Follow up simple eﬀects tests showed that the low BDI
group took signiﬁcantly longer to reach criterion in the pre-exposure
group than in the non pre-exposure group, F(1, 142) = 30.37,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.17. Moreover, the trials to criterion score of the
non-pre-exposure, low BDI group (M= 6.42, SE = 0.88) did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from the best possible score of 5, t(37) = 1.62, p= 0.114.
Scores for the other three groups were signiﬁcantly> 5, all ts > 5.49,
all ps < 0.001. There was no reliable diﬀerence between pre-exposure
and no pre-exposure groups for high BDI participants, F(1, 142) = 2.48,
p= 0.118, ηp2 = 0.017.
In order to explore the absence of the pre-exposure eﬀect in high
BDI participants further, we compared their trials to criterion scores
across Experiments 1 and 2. For the no pre-exposure groups, perfor-
mance was signiﬁcantly worse in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, F(1,
63) = 10.02, MSE = 46.05, p= 0.002. However for the pre-exposure
groups, there was no reliable diﬀerence in performance between the
two experiments, F < 1, p > 0.5.
2.2.2. D-prime
Fig. 7 shows corresponding D′ data across each trial block and
Table 3
Participant characteristics for Experiment 2.
Pre-exposure No pre-exposure
Same context Diﬀerent context Same context Diﬀerent context
Low BDI High BDI Low BDI High BDI Low BDI High BDI Low BDI High BDI
n= 16 n= 18 n= 26 n= 13 n= 29 n= 11 n= 22 n= 12
BDI 2.00 (0.42) 13.71 (1.33) 1.32 (0.31) 10.41 (0.89) 2.11 (0.45) 10.43 (0.92) 1.84 (0.38) 13.20 (1.52)
DASS-D 2.00 (0.52) 10.50 (1.53) 0.68 (0.27) 8.53 (0.89) 1.63 (0.31) 7.62 (1.28) 1.47 (0.32) 8.87 (2.14)
DASS-S 2.94 (0.96) 10.25 (1.44) 2.05 (0.45) 9.65 (1.09) 4.95 (0.79) 8.95 (1.16) 2.79 (0.55) 11.27 (1.71)
DASS-A 1.69 (0.56) 6.46 (0.97) 0.79 (0.63) 5.18 (1.02) 1.63 (0.42) 4.90 (0.76) 0.79 (0.27) 6.00 (1.80)
Estimated IQ 113.51 (0.99) 111.62 (0.85) 111.08 (2.00) 107.42 (2.74) 111.52 (1.12) 109.54 (1.22) 111.63 (1.42) 112.27 (1.55)
Digit 8.06 (0.35) 7.25 (0.39) 7.58 (0.22) 6.94 (0.28) 7.47 (0.25) 7.90 (0.24) 7.53 (0.25) 7.20 (0.28)
NB. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DASS = Depression (D), Anxiety (A), Stress (S) Scales. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Fig. 6. Mean number of trials to reach the success criterion of ﬁve consecutive correct
trials without false alarms as a function of pre-exposure, context change, and mood state.
Note. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. Pre = pre-exposure; N-Pre = no
pre-exposure; Same = same context; Dif = diﬀerent context; Low = low BDI; High = high
BDI.
Fig. 7. Mean value for D′ for each trial block as a function of pre-exposure, context and mood state. Note. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Pre = pre-exposure; No-Pre = no
pre-exposure; Same = same context; Dif = diﬀerent context; Low = low BDI; High = high BDI.
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experimental group, including context group. Similar to the criterion
data, D′ suggests that whilst the eﬀect of pre-exposure is very evident
for low BDI participants, the eﬀect may be absent for high BDI
participants. If anything, there seemed to be stronger trends in diﬀerent
than same context conditions.
The analysis showed that D′ values were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
pre-exposure, F(1, 142) = 19.26, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.119, trial block,
F(3, 426) = 78.63, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.356, and BDI group, F(1, 142)
= 8.41, p= 0.004, ηp2 = 0.056. There were also signiﬁcant interac-
tions between trial block and pre-exposure, F(3, 426) = 3.95,
p= 0.008, ηp2 = 0.027, and BDI group and pre-exposure, F(1, 142)
= 4.93, p= 0.028, ηp2 = 0.034. The interaction between trial block
and context group approached but did not reach the level of signiﬁ-
cance, F(3, 426) = 2.60, p= 0.052, ηp2 = 0.018. Follow up simple
eﬀects analyses showed that, as in Experiment 1, the size of the pre-
exposure eﬀect reduced over trial blocks (block 1 ηp2 = 0.156, block 2
ηp
2 = 0.113, block 3 ηp2 = 0.073, block 4 ηp2 = 0.031), whilst remain-
ing signiﬁcant throughout. The further exploration of the BDI by pre-
exposure interaction showed that whilst low BDI groups showed a
strong pre-exposure eﬀect, F(1, 142) = 21.56, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.132,
high BDI groups did not, F(1, 142) = 2.38, p= 0.125, ηp2 = 0.016. In
addition, whilst there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between high and low
BDI D′ values in no pre-exposure conditions, F(1, 142) = 12.99,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.084, there was no diﬀerence between the groups
in pre-exposure conditions, F < 1, suggesting that high BDI perfor-
mance was equally poor irrespective of pre-exposure.
Taken together, our ﬁndings here suggest that non-depressed
participants are equally sensitive to stimuli presented with no outcomes
outside of the immediate task frame, irrespective of context, whether or
not that information is accompanied by the presence or absence of
action. Depressed participants, however, only displayed sensitivity to
the pre-exposure manipulation when it was marked by actions and not
when it was marked by the absence of actions. In the second
experiment, depressed participants' learning was equally poor whether
or not they were pre-exposed.
3. General discussion
In this series of experiments, we set out to answer the question of
why people with mild depression do not integrate contingency infor-
mation presented outside the current task frame into their learning like
non-depressed people do. We reasoned that properties of the informa-
tion itself caused this pattern, such as diﬀerential sensitivity to absence
information (of stimuli, of outcomes of behaviour), to context or simply
having a very speciﬁc frame of reference (e.g., constrained focal set of
events, Cheng &Novick, 1990) for on-going learning. We found that
information presented outside of the frame of the current task
inﬂuenced all of our participants' contingency learning, in some
circumstances. According to these ﬁndings, people who are mildly
depressed are equally capable as others of integrating presentations of
stimuli, which are unaccompanied by outcomes, into their contingency
learning. However, when that information was accompanied by the
absence of action, across both experimental phases, rather than just the
pre-exposure phase, then sensitivity to the presence versus absence of
that information was eliminated and performance was generally poor.
In order to explicate these ﬁndings further, we ﬁrst discuss possible
explanations for these eﬀects before discussing implications for theory,
depression and limitations of the work.
3.1. Theoretical implications
Learning about the relationships between events or actions and
outcomes has been subject to analysis using a contingency framework
for the last 50 years (e.g., Jenkins &Ward, 1965; Ward & Jenkins,
1965). Researchers have investigated the ﬁt between human contin-
gency judgements and various rules for combining information from the
contingency matrix into one measure (e.g., Allan, 1980; Cheng, 1997).
All these rules share the assumption of equal weighting of contingency
information although this has been shown to be violated on numerous
occasions (e.g., Crocker, 1981; Shaklee &Wasserman, 1986; Wasserman
et al., 1990). A more fundamental assumption is that contingency
information (cells a through d) and their weighting in learning is based
on properties of relevant stimuli themselves. So, for example, cell ‘a’ is
highly weighted because the stimulus is present and the reinforcing
outcome is also present. Cell ‘d’ is weighted low or neglected because
both stimulus and reinforcing outcome are absent.
One implication of our ﬁndings may be that weighting based on
‘stimulus properties’ themselves may not always occur. ‘Adjacent’
stimulus information, such as whether other stimuli or actions are
present, also inﬂuences the extent to which people weight and integrate
information into their learning. We have come to this initial conclusion
because the key diﬀerence between Experiments 1 and 2 is whether the
pre-exposed predictive stimulus was accompanied by diﬀerent actions
across Phases 1 and 2, as in Experiment 1 (Phase 1: no action; Phase 2:
action), or by the same actions, as in Experiment 2 (Phase 1: no action;
Phase 2: no action).
For the non-depressed, the diﬀerence or similarity between the two
phases did not matter; they still evidenced the predicted perception of a
weak contingency between stimulus and outcome in pre-exposure
conditions. This is consistent with the idea that exposure to or learning
about the predictive stimulus itself and its properties governed their
performance in Phase 2. At ﬁrst glance, it seemed that in Experiment 2,
pre-exposure information had no impact on depressed participants,
suggesting complete information neglect. However, closer examination
of both data sets (statistical comparison Experiment 1 versus
Experiment 2) suggested a diﬀerent conclusion. In Experiment 2, the
performance of depressed participants was equally poor in both
Experiment 2 conditions and comparable to their pre-exposure perfor-
mance in Experiment 1.
This analysis suggests then that, for depressed participants, it was
not their experience of the predictive stimulus that determined their
performance but the adjacent non-action experience. Furthermore, the
integration or neglect of speciﬁc types of information may not be a
given based simply on the properties of the stimuli themselves. Rather,
based on the performance of our depressed participants, information
weighting or neglect may be dynamic and dependent on adjacent
stimuli. This conclusion is based on the excellent performance that
depressed participants displayed in Experiment 1 versus their very poor
performance observed in Experiment 2. This cross-experiment compar-
ison suggests that depressed participants completely integrated the
adjacent no-action information in Experiment 2, whether or not a
speciﬁc stimulus was pre-exposed. Thus it could be argued that the net
result of this, for depressed participants, was that Phase 1 trials were
integrated into their cell ‘d’ experience in both the pre-exposure and no
pre-exposure groups, as shown in Fig. 8. This would result in a
degraded contingency for both groups and is consistent with the poor
performance we observed in both pre-exposed and non pre-exposed
participants.
On the basis of that analysis, we can return to the contingency
calculation to check the predictive power of the two stimuli that were
presented during Phase 2 of the task. Recall that the triangle, the
stimulus which predicts outcomes, is now relocated to the lower row of
the contingency table because both in Phase 1 and Phase 2 it occurs
along with no actions (see Fig. 8, bottom half of the contingency tables).
Assuming the complete integration of Phase 1 trials (+80), the
predictive power of the triangle computes to a weak contingency,
where ΔP= 0.2. The predictive power of the square stimulus, which
does not predict the outcome, also computes to a weak contingency,
but in the opposite direction, where ΔP=−0.2. Therefore the
contingency analysis [of these observed eﬀects] is that, for depressed
participants, both the predictive and non-predictive cue had equally
weak predictive power (i.e. ΔP = 0.2 and ΔP =−0.2).
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Fig. 8 further suggests that the individual diﬀerences reported here
are entirely consistent with a contingency framework applied to
information integration. As we argued in the introduction, the con-
tingency framework is attractive because it often provides an accurate
account of the decisions people make in such conditions (Le
Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010) and allows us to focus on the informa-
tional content of experience on which individual diﬀerences are based.
However, this approach does not provide much insight into the
processes underlying the individual diﬀerence.
For such insight, we might look to associative models, such as the
Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla &Wagner, 1972) and Pearce's model
of stimulus generalisation (Pearce, 1987), which explicitly show how
‘adjacent’ stimuli can reduce the amount of associative strength (a
construct which is used as isomorphic to contingency strength) that any
one stimulus can accumulate. Thus in our contingency analysis, shown
in Fig. 8, of the depression eﬀect reported here, we showed how
depressed participants might be exposed to two very weak contingency
conditions, with their performance being consistent with this. At
asymptote, associative models often produce identical predictions to
the contingency framework but for diﬀerent reasons. From that
perspective, every stimulus present shares the limited amount of
associative strength available for any given outcome. Thus, additional
stimuli present on learning trials will always compromise the ability of
the others to acquire strength because of the shared nature of
associations (e.g., Shanks, 1989). This process is known as cue
competition. In addition, it is also the similarity between conﬁgurations
or groups of stimuli, which includes all stimuli present in a given
context, that aﬀects the extent to which learning in one situation (e.g.,
Phase 1) generalises to another situation (Phase 2) (Pearce, 1987).
These theories might help answer the question as to why there are
diﬀerences between the depressed and non-depressed. It could be that
cue competition itself is aﬀected by depression. If this were the case
then, for depressed people, this would mean that the predictive
stimulus, and arguably the non-action, accumulate little of the available
associative strength. Hence, in Experiment 2, their performance was
equally poor across conditions. Another suggestion links to the simi-
larity between the task phases. It could be argued that the components
of the learning task (e.g., , context, no action) were more similar
across the two learning phases in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
This might indicate that, for our depressed participants, the greater
similarity between Phases 1 and 2, drove strong generalisation from all
of the events that occurred in Phase 1 to the events that occurred in
Phase 2. Note that we use the term generalisation loosely here to
indicate that Phase 1 exposure aﬀected and compromised Phase 2
performance similarly in pre-exposure and no pre-exposure conditions.
So, from the experimenter's perspective, the only pre-exposed stimulus
was the subsequently predictive stimulus (the blue triangle), and this
pre-exposure eﬀect was always evident for non-depressed participants.
However, for depressed participants, the entire array of stimuli includ-
ing context and non-actions may have acted as the pre-exposed
stimulus, which then generalised to Phase 2 compromising learning
in both pre-exposure and no pre-exposure groups. In order to explain
compromised performance, we have to assume that both groups of
depressed participants experienced a pre-exposure eﬀect. Indeed our
data are consistent with this idea.
There are multiple theoretical approaches which attempt to explain
the processes which underlie pre-exposure eﬀects, including retrieval
failure due to non-reinforced stimulus exposure (e.g., Bouton, 1993)
and loss of salience (Rescorla &Wagner, 1972) or associability (e.g.,
McLaren &Mackintosh, 2000) but there is little consensus in the
literature on which theory provides the most convincing account (Le
Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010). However, the important point to note
here is that it was the additional between phase similarity evident in
Experiment 2 that aﬀected depressed people's performance patterns -
but not non-depressed - and this is why we might term their
performance as ‘over-generalised’.
This suggestion is interesting because in many cases depression's
eﬀects on contingency learning have led to ‘better’ learning about
actions and outcomes (e.g., depressive realism: Alloy & Abramson,
1979) because of context information being neglected in their judge-
ments. In this case, when depression eﬀects were apparent, poorer
learning resulted and this was not linked to learning about context. This
explanation is consistent with other evidence of ‘over-generalisation’ in
depression (e.g., Rekart, Mineka, & Zinbarg, 2006; Williams & Scott,
1988) which contributes depressive thinking styles and over-general-
isation errors as described in cognitive theory of depression (Beck,
1967; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Similar generalisation trends are
evident in schizophrenia (e.g., Wood, Brewin, &McLeod, 2006) and
other psychopathologies (see Hackmann &Holmes, 2004) suggesting
that generalisation may play a role in other well-known failures to
integrate information from outside the task frame (e.g., Baruch et al.,
1988; Gray et al., 1992; Guterman et al., 1996). A further implication is
that for non-depressed participants there is an optimal generalisation
proﬁle based on generalising relevant information and which only
results in impaired learning in speciﬁc conditions. We do note however
that this is only one possible explanation for our ﬁndings.
For example, it could be argued that diﬀerences in learning between
our depressed and non-depressed participants are based on the manip-
ulation of the response alternatives between Experiments 1 and 2, and
what we are reporting here is merely an artefact of behavioural
passivity (e.g., Blanco, Matute, & Vadillo, 2009; Msetﬁ, Kumar,
Harmer, &Murphy, 2016) in depression. We can reject this suggestion
for several reasons. Firstly, in both experiments, behavioural action and
non-action were both required for good performance. A participant
Fig. 8. Conditional probabilities and contingency calculations for Experiment 2 in the case of complete integration of Phase 1 information. NB: +80 refers to the addition of Phase 1 pre-
exposure trials; * refers to the predictive response participants must make in each trial in Phase 2.
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who, in Experiment 1, was able to predict the auditory outcome with
the action very successfully, would also have to withhold that action on
non-predictive trials. An error on either trial type would result in the
trials to criterion count being reset to zero. Similarly, in Experiment 2,
whilst non-predictive trials required the action and predictive trials did
not, an error on either trial type matters. Any depressed participant
with aberrant response levels would produce poor scores in both
experiments. Moreover, in both experiments, we calculated a target
sensitivity measure, known as D-prime, which is used in the psycho-
physical literature to measure target sensitivity whilst discounting any
kind of response bias. The D-prime data produced identical results to
the success criterion data. This suggests that our ﬁndings of depression
eﬀects are not simple behavioural artefacts of the diﬀerent response
alternative but are valid learning eﬀects.
3.2. Limitations
An obvious limitation of this study is that the depressed participants
(high BDI groups) score above the median on the depression scale
rather the score as depressed based on any standardised, clinically
informed cut oﬀ score (Beck et al., 1961). Here, as in other studies
(Chase et al., 2011), we used this strategy for pragmatic reasons, to
maximise our sample size, but also under the assumption that the
diﬀerences between non-depressed and depressed are continuous rather
than qualitative in nature (Cox, Enns, Borger, & Parker, 1999) and
should therefore be present to a lesser degree in participants who score
just above the median. In order to reassure readers on this point, we
reanalysed our data excluding participants who scored between 5 (cut
oﬀ used in this experiment for mild depression) and 9 (clinical cut oﬀ)
on the BDI. Consistent with the continuity assumption, eﬀects were
stronger in this reduced sample (ηp2 = 0.07) than in the mildly
depressed sample who scored above the median (ηp2 = 0.05).
4. Conclusions
As an answer to the question we posed in this paper, we conclude
that depressed and non-depressed participants are both able to inte-
grate no outcome information from outside the current task frame into
subsequent predictive learning. However, for mildly depressed partici-
pants, integration was dependent on the similarity of accompanying
information, and we conclude that they experience strong patterns of
generalisation which can compromise their contingency learning in
some conditions.
Appendix A. Appendix 1
Stimuli and room pictures.
Appendix B. Appendix 2
Phase 1 instructions.
“This experiment consists of two stages. You will be given the
instructions for stage 2 after you have completed the ﬁrst stage. During
the game, you will be in a room where there is a TV. The TV is
connected to a games console, which has been set up and placed ready
for you to play. The room will look like the one shown on the right of
this screen. The game involves computer codes. In the ﬁrst stage of the
game, you will see a series of 3-letter codes appear on the TV screen one
after the other. It is very important that you pay attention to these
codes. Your task is to identify the 4th code and then to count how many
times it is repeated. You will be asked to report the number of
repetitions at the end of this stage of the experiment. This part of the
experiment will take about 3 minutes. Please ask the experimenter if
you have any questions.”
Phase 2 instructions Experiment 1.
“In the second Phase of the experiment, you will be in a room where
the TV and the games console have been set up and placed ready for
you to play a game. The room will look similar to the picture you can
see on the right of the screen now. You will see a series of 3-letter
computer codes presented one after the other on the TV screen. During
the game, you will also notice the occurrence of some small explosions.
It is your task to discern the rule that guides when the explosion
happens. Whenever you think an explosion is ABOUT to take place, you
should press the SPACEBAR on the computer keyboard. Even when you
think you know the rule, please continue with the game. This part of the
experiment will take about 6 minutes. Please ask the experimenter if
you have any questions.”
Phase 2 instructions Experiment 2.
“In the second phase of the experiment, you will be in a room where
the TV and the games console have been set up and placed ready for
you to play a game. The room will look similar to the picture you can
see on the right of the screen now. You will see a series of 3-letter
computer codes presented one after the other on the TV screen. During
the game, you will also notice the occurrence of some small explosions.
It is your task to discern the rule that guides when the explosion is
about to happen and when it is not about to happen. So you need to do
two things: Whenever you think that an explosion IS about to happen,
signal this by doing nothing. So DO NOT PRESS the spacebar on the
computer keyboard when you think that there WILL be an explosion.
Whenever you think an explosion IS NOT about to happen, signal this
by pressing the spacebar. In other words, only PRESS the spacebar on
the computer keyboard every time you do not think an explosion will
occur. Even when you think you know the rule, please continue with
the game. This part of the experiment will take about 6 minutes. Please
ask the experimenter if you have any questions.”
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